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Abstract 
 
This chapter is concerned with a consideration of the factors that shape the 
relationships between risk management and the strategy processes and which serve to 
erode organisational resilience as a consequence. The academic literature highlights 
the widespread acceptance of the need for an effective relationship between strategy 
and risk management, but it also acknowledges that they are not fully integrated in 
practice. The chapter seeks to identify some of the reasons why this dislocation occurs 
and it sets out four core issues that are held to be important within this context. These 
four elements are captured by the acronym RITA in which the processes around Risk, 
Indeterminacy, Transformations, and Acceptability are used as a basis to consider 
some of the wider problems that emerge within organisations. The RITA elements are 
held to interact with each other to generate a level of complexity that challenges the 
core capabilities and competencies of the organisation and which need to be 
considered within the context of its strategy. The chapter argues that the effective 
integration of risk and strategic management require a holistic approach be taken by 
organisations – a task for which they are currently ill-prepared.   
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The symbiosis of failure: The strategic dynamics of risk and resilience 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“if an event or a kind of behavior meets a predetermined criterion, whatever 
the criterion is, then we say it is a success. If the criterion is violated, then a 
failure occurs” - (Cai, 1996, p. 115).  
 
“Adding the word failure implies that an abnormality has to be rectified 
through some intervention process” (Hughes, 2007, p. 97). 
 
The notion of failure permeates many aspects of society. News reports provide 
accounts of failures in service provision as well as the failures of professionals to 
protect those in their care. There are also accounts of failures in the products and core 
processes of organisations, sometimes with catastrophic consequences. Even 
governments are not immune from failures of policy. In all cases, the questions that 
are asked after the event are essentially along the lines of ‘how could this happen, 
why were the risks of failure not identified and acted upon’? Any discussion of 
failure, whether it is framed in terms of - healthcare interventions, engineering, policy 
making, or management practices, amongst others - is plagued by a core problem of 
the definition of failure when framed within a particular context (Morris, LaForge, & 
Allen, 1994; Watson & Everett, 1999). Even in the areas of risk and resilience the 
definition of ‘failure’ (along with that of crisis) and its relationship to other terms has 
been the source of some ambiguity (Smith, 2006; Smith & Fischbacher, 2009). 
Failure is, therefore in many respects, in the eyes of the beholder, but as a systems 
state it does not exist in isolation. Failure is also dependent on a range of elements 
that are at work within the system and against which that ‘failure’ is judged. This 
symbiotic nature of failure and its relationships to wider processes around strategy sits 
at the core of the literature on risk and resilience. Irrespective on the definition of 
failure used, there is a sense that when failure occurs then the objectives of the system 
have not been met in full and that the host organisation has not been operating at the 
level of effectiveness required to prevent that failure.  
In commenting on the nature of failure in healthcare, Hughes (2007), in the 
opening quote, highlights the notion that failure implies that there is some 
abnormality that needs to be addressed, thereby suggesting that any corrective action 
taken by the organisation has the potential to rectify this abnormal phenomenon. One 
might argue that risk, resilience, and crisis management each have a focus on these 
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processes of intervention by seeking to identify, prevent, and respond to those 
organisational abnormalities that have the potential to cause harm. There is a case to 
be made, therefore, for linking these processes around risk to the wider mechanisms 
by which strategy is developed and operationalized (Mitroff, Pearson, & Pauchant, 
1992; Power, 2005; Smith, 1992) with a goal of achieving effective performance 
around resilience (Fischbacher-Smith, 2014b). Within the literature, there is 
considerable agreement that organisations need to consider the nature of risk as an 
integral part of the strategic management process, but there appears to be a dislocation 
between these aspirations to integrate the processes conceptually and the realities of 
practice (Mikes, 2009, 2011). Recent work on resilience has recognised that its 
processes have an inherently strategic nature and that embedding these demands in 
the structures and processes of organisations and communities should be a core aspect 
of that approach (Carmeli & Markman, 2011; Hamel & Valikangas, 2003; Norris, 
Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008; Somers, 2009). The obvious 
question to pose then is why, when there is considerable agreement of the significance 
of the relationships between risk, resilience, and strategy, are the relationships 
between them appear to be so fractured?  
The demand for greater certainty around the management of risk is a long-
standing challenge for management and one that has transcended a number of 
organisational contexts in which risk is considered (see, for example, Irwin, Smith, & 
Griffiths, 1982; Mikes, 2009; Power, 2004, 2008).  This search for greater certainty 
has become an ever-more elusive construct as organisational systems become 
increasingly complex, operate over longer distances, and have to contend with 
increasing demands for certainty and control. 
Our aim in this chapter is to consider this question and it does so by 
considering how four inter-related elements of the failure process can interact together 
to generate problems for organisations in integrating resilience (as capability) and 
strategy (as intent). In addition to dealing with some of the ambiguities and nuances 
around the nature of risk, the chapter sets out three other elements that are relevant to 
shaping strategic failures. The first of these concerns the indeterminate nature of 
many of the hazards facing organisations, especially within a highly connected and 
complex environment. Secondly, it highlights the importance of transformation 
processes within the emergence of new forms of hazard and the organisation’s 
responses to those challenges. Finally, it considers the ways in which the range of 
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hazards facing the organisation are framed and judged to be acceptable, or otherwise, 
by key decision-makers. These four elements – set out using the acronym RITA – are 
used to highlight the scale of the underlying issues that inhibit organisations from 
taking a more holistic perspective on the relationships between failure and strategy.  
The chapter seeks to contextualise these issues by setting the challenges that they 
present within the processes of risk and resilience research and to frame them within 
the wider contexts of strategic management that operate within organisations. The 
core argument developed here concerns the nature and utilisation of knowledge by 
managers within the context of uncertain and highly damaging events. In essence, the 
chapter seeks to consider how organisations deal with an ever more complicated 
portfolio of hazards and do so within a complex environment where the potential for 
emergent conditions is high. The discussions reflect the literatures on what Mikes 
(2009) has termed “calculative cultures”, in which the power of technical expertise 
has been a dominant element in the determination of risk. As a first step in exploring 
the challenges for the strategic management of from these issues, we first need to 
reflect on the nature of organisational failure.  
 
Organisational failure – fragments of a failure in strategy 
“The future is totally unpredictable. Organizations are unpredictable. Efforts 
to control organizations are futile, even harmful to organizations. Planning 
stifles strategic thinking. What is to be done?......Surprisingly, there is much 
that can be done……” - (Sherden, 1998, p. 241) 
 
“any attempt to explain organizational failure will not be complete unless the 
interplay between contextual forces and organizational dynamics is taken into 
account” - (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004, p. 34.).  
 
These two quotes highlight the pervasive nature of organisational failure, the 
holistic causal factors that generate it, the role of uncertainty as a critical element 
within the management of risk, and the constraints around attempts at organisational 
control. At its core, failure can be seen an essentially perceptual construct. Within our 
daily organisational lives we can see failure defined and redefined depending on the 
vantage point and vested interest of the individual who is making the judgement. 
There are, of course, clearly defined failures within organisations that are not easily 
reconfigured, no matter how effective the organisation’s public relations capabilities 
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might be. Catastrophic accidents, especially those involving loss of life and resource, 
cannot be easily redefined in a positive light. They point to the ineffectiveness of the 
organisation in controlling its activities and the failure of managers to anticipate and 
prevent these adverse events from occurring (Fischbacher-Smith, 2014a). It is with 
such catastrophic forms of failure that have clear strategic impacts that this essay is 
concerned.  
There is little doubt that failures within the core technologies and processes of 
an organisation can generate problems for its strategy, especially where that 
organisation is already experiencing problems. For example, the loss of two Malaysia 
Airlines aircraft in 2014, both in controversial circumstances, led to a severe decline 
in the company’s share price and resulted in job cuts and the development of a revised 
strategy to turn the company around (Topham, 2015). Conversely, an organisation’s 
strategy can also shape the generation of the conditions that lead to catastrophic 
failure (Turner, 1976). An example of this relationship can be found in the accident 
on board the Deepwater Horizon oil-rig that resulted in loss of life, severe 
environmental impact, and which has been seen as a failure in the governance 
processes within the strategy of deep-water drilling (Osofsky, 2013). This accident 
ultimately generated a multi-level crisis for both BP and the US Government (Audra 
& Jennie, 2013; Smithson & Venette, 2013). Its genesis, however, could be seen to lie 
in the heavy dependence that Western countries have on oil imports and the geo-
politics of the oil-producing regions. These factors have resulted in the search for 
additional sources of hydrocarbon resources, often in increasingly hostile 
environments with the attendant risks of working in such a setting. In the aftermath of 
the accident, the role of politicians in shaping a risky strategy of deep water drilling 
was overshadowed by the blame that fell on BP as the main contractor. Whilst BP 
clearly bears responsibility for the accident, they are not the only villains in the case 
(Houck, 2010). On the basis of these examples alone, it could be argued that that risk 
and resilience are intrinsically linked to the strategic management process in what 
amounts to a symbiotic relationship – each has the potential to feed off the other. Why 
then are these processes not considered more systematically and holistically by 
organisations, academic research, and business education?   
The globalised nature of modern organisations ensures that the interactions 
between elements of the RITA acronym occur across space and time and this adds a 
layer of complexity for managers to contend with. Highly interconnected 
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organisations may experience a crisis if the vulnerabilities that are inherent in the 
organisation are exposed at points within this global landscape of activities. Mellahi 
and Wilkinson remind us of the importance of the various interactions that occur both 
within the organisation and as a result of its interaction with its environmental 
contexts.  The plurality of environmental settings in which organisations operate, 
across a global network of interactions, serves to create fractures in organisational 
controls that generate varying degrees of vulnerability at different points in space-
time. The distributed and interconnected nature of supply chains and the 
instantaneous coverage of catastrophic events by global news networks will ensure 
that the reputational aspects of any crisis become problematic for organisations.  The 
range of task demands generated by shifts in the relationships between an 
organisation’s environment and its capabilities has the effect of moving an 
organisation away from its designed-for state.  They do so in a way that can create 
conditions that can exceed the contingency capabilities that are in place to deal with 
the anticipated perturbations that may affect the wider system (Hodge & Coronado, 
2007; Smith, 2005; Tsoukas, 1999). As organisations extend the scale and locations of 
their activities, they increase the interactions that occur between the elements of that 
wider system. The result is the creation of a complex mosaic of interactions that 
generate emergent conditions, which then serve to challenge the dynamic capabilities 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece & Pisano, 1994) that the organisation has in place. 
These perturbations can also create the conditions where the various control systems 
that are in place are unable to prevent failure from occurring (Fischbacher-Smith, 
2014b; Smith, 2005).  
Failure is often defined in multiple ways depending on the circumstances in 
which it is judged (Dörner, 1996) but it is seen as both pervasive and inevitable, 
especially in socio-technical systems (Petroski, 1985).  At an organisational level, 
failure can be seen to occur when the organisation does not have sufficient fit between 
its internal capabilities and the external task demands imposed upon it (Miles & 
Snow, 1994). The notion of ‘misfit’ is identified by Miles and Snow as a critical 
element in the failure process but it is also one that is seen to defy prediction on 
occasions: 
“Occasional situations of misfit and failure are beyond managerial anticipation 
and/or influence…….. managers cannot forsee or prevent some forms of 
organizational failure” (Miles & Snow, 1994, p. 66) 
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Thus, the abilities of management, as both a functional area and as a set of processes, 
are central to the generation of failure conditions, and do so as a result of acts of 
commission or omission by managers operating over space and time. The result is the 
incubation of failure potential and this has been an issue that has attracted 
considerable attention (Collingridge, 1992; Reason, 1990, 1993a; Turner, 1978, 
1994a). The incremental nature of the incubation process is seen to be of importance:  
“One of the most troublesome aspects of misfit and failure is that the process 
by which they occur is incremental, interactive, and cumulative. If harmful 
changes occur over a long enough period, both the changes and the 
adaptations made to them may well become so deeply ingrained in the 
organization that the next generation of manager takes them as given” (Miles 
& Snow, 1994, p. 68) 
 
The situation becomes more complicated when human actors are involved in 
the failure process. Human actions that serve to precipitate failure can be accidental 
(slips and lapses) or intentional acts (mistakes and violations) (Reason, 1990) and 
both groups of actions can create significant challenges around the development and 
maintenance of control. In addition, these actions can be latent (delayed in effect) or 
active (immediate in effect), with the result that human interventions have the 
potential to shape the conditions of failure at multiple levels and across different 
timelines. In addition to generating the conditions that precipitate strategic failure, 
human actions can also serve to erode the processes around mitigation and control. As 
a consequence, the processes around failure can be seen to be intrinsically linked to 
the actions of human operators – through the decision-making process, the manner in 
which technical expertise is used to justify decisions (especially where the extent of 
uncertainty is high), and the acceptability of key decisions involving risk and 
uncertainty.  Failure is, therefore, a term that is related to a number of other elements 
that coalesce around it.  
The strategic nature of organisational failure (in its various guises) is a 
concept that has a long history within the academic literature (Pauchant & Mitroff, 
1992; Reason, 1993a, 1997; Smith, 1992, 1995; Tenner, 1996; Turner, 1978, 1994a). 
Despite this history, business schools have been seen as somewhat reluctant to 
incorporate crisis concepts within mainstream programmes (Comer, 2013) and to do 
so in a manner that recognises the role that managerial decision-making plays in the 
process (Fischbacher-Smith & Fischbacher-Smith, 2013). These decisions can 
generate acute problems around failures by creating the conditions for active errors, 
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whilst also generating more chronic (or latent) errors (Collingridge, 1992; Reason, 
1990, 1993b). As a result, the relationships between the strategy process and failure 
can be seen to operate at two levels. The first occurs as a result of the creation of a set 
of conditions in which human operators working within the socio-technical system are 
forced into error traps (Reason, 1987, 1990). The second, relates to the decisions that 
are taken in one time period in which their consequences are not immediately realised 
but instead the error cost is embedded, or incubated, within the system (Collingridge, 
1992; Turner, 1978, 1994a).  Inherent in both forms of error generation are a range of 
processes around the generation of uncertainty within the decision-making process 
and the manner in which expertise and the organisation’s knowledge base is brought 
to bear on the decision problem. 
The actions of managers in designing, shaping, and adapting these controls, or 
by generating activities that can exceed their boundaries, can create additional 
vulnerabilities within the organisation (Reason, 1997; Turner, 1994a). For some, this 
terrain of activities represents failures of both foresight and hindsight in which the set 
of problematic practices that have emerged have the potential to cause harm (Reason, 
1997; Toft & Reynolds, 1994; Turner, 1978). If we add to this the intentional actions 
of hostile actors – those malevolent individuals who actively seek to cause harm by 
exposing vulnerabilities in controls – then any control processes have to be able to 
constantly adapt to meet the demands of an ever-changing threat matrix. Any such 
adaption needs to occur without creating further emergent conditions that can lead to 
new forms of unrecognised vulnerability. This is often especially problematic when 
those vulnerabilities occur in the underpinning critical infrastructures on which 
organisations rely, but which lie outside of their control, and are therefore effectively 
ignored (Boin & Smith, 2006). The result is the generation of what is effectively an 
arms race between a set of emergent conditions that are constantly evolving and a set 
of controls that management has put in place to prevent certain harmful events from 
occurring. 
Organisations are, therefore, faced with a set of operational and strategic 
challenges around the management of hazards and the associated failure potential. 
These challenges include: the collection, analysis, synthesis, and distribution of 
information relating to systems performance; the maintenance of capabilities that 
allow for the control of processes, technologies, and material flows and 
transformations; the effective control of human resources on an increasingly global 
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scale and in a way that negates any threats arising from hostile insiders; and the 
management of a range of transformative processes that operate at different levels of 
scale, speed and reach in ways that reflect the balance between effectiveness, 
efficiencies, and the risk of failure. These issues generate both considerable and 
challenging task demands for the strategic management of organisations.  
The intellectual and practical challenge for managers is to be able to identify 
and act on a range of such failure modes and effects – a task for which, it could be 
argued, the management function is invariably ill-prepared. In part, this is a function 
of the difficulties associated with the control of a diverse, but essentially synergistic, 
range of potential hazards and the requirement to manage them over increased spatial 
and temporal contexts. Given the highly interactive and coupled nature of modern 
organisations, it is not surprising that the speed and range of these failures can often 
generate the potential for catastrophic failure (Perrow, 1981, 1984, 2011) and 
confound attempts at prediction. A particular problem in prediction concerns that 
category of failures described as extreme events (low probability-high consequence 
hazards), as these are often deemed to be of such a low probability of occurrence that 
effective control mechanisms are not put in place to deal with them.  The assumption 
is often made that existing controls will prevent the escalation of any perturbation so 
that it does not reach the point of catastrophic failure. This ‘Titanic Syndrome’ 
(Smith, 1995) – in which the belief in the reliability of the technology or the 
organisation’s capabilities is such that effective contingency plans are not put in place 
-  can lead to the suppression of concerns about potential failure modes or mitigations 
strategies because there is no a priori evidence to support such a failure scenario.  
One of the challenges here concerns this predictive capability of risk analysis. 
Risk analytical techniques are at their strongest when dealing with phenomena where 
the failure modes and effects are known and understood and where the probabilities 
associated with such failures are also known and with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy. Invariably, this predictive capability is eroded when the issues considered 
are strategic rather than operational. Space and time also contribute to this increased 
uncertainty as they increase the potential for emergent conditions to generate 
intervening variables that confound the predictive process.  
Figure 1 takes the challenges around risk and the three other elements that 
were identified earlier in the paper using the RITA acronym and highlights a range of 
additional issues that are felt to have an impact on the strategic dynamics of failure. 
	 10	
We can now turn our attention briefly to each of the major elements of this 
framework, starting with the ambiguities that are present within the processes around 
risk itself.  
 
 
Figure 1 – the nature of failure and resilient organisations 
 
 
 
 
The ambiguities of risk 
Risk, and the manner in which the ambiguities within it are incorporated into 
decision-making, have been widely discussed within the academic literature (Curley, 
Yates, & Abrams, 1986; Ellsberg, 1961; Haisley & Weber, 2010; Knight, 1921; 
Rigotti & Shannon, 2012). The ambiguities inherent within a risk-based problem have 
been shown to impact upon the perceptions that individuals have of that risk (Camerer 
& Weber, 1992; Ghosh & Ray, 1997; Riddel, 2009) and these ambiguities can be 
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related to the understanding of the phenomena, its probabilities of occurrence and the 
associated consequences of the hazard, along with the manner in which information 
about that hazard is communicated and evaluated (Fox & Tversky, 1995; Frisch & 
Baron, 1988).  Against such a background it is not surprising that organisations seem 
to struggle to incorporate risk-related concepts into their strategies in a way that is 
both transparent and meaningful. A core element that is associated with the generation 
of such ambiguities around risk, concerns the definition of the main elements of the 
term.  
At a basic level, risk can be seen to consist of: a source of hazard or harm that 
has been identified; the probability of that hazard being realised; and the 
consequences that are associated with it.  For many forms of hazard, there is 
considerable uncertainty relating to the cause and effect relationships that exist within 
a particular set of hazard pathways. The interactions between these elements of risk 
assessment can also serve to generate a set of challenges around the ways in which we 
attempt to manage that risk. Thus, we can argue that whilst the concept of risk may 
have its origins in actuarial approaches to failure (Sherden, 1998), it does not provide 
the certainty around cause and effect that such actuarial approaches might imply. 
Neither does it always provide a sense of the predictive validity around the 
probabilities attributed to different forms of hazard. It is because of the complexities 
within the management of risk that some have argued that it is essentially a social 
construction (Beck, 1992; Nelkin, 1989; Short, 1984). Such views are clearly at odds 
with those held in many parts of the risk industry, but the reality is likely to be 
somewhere between the two extremes. For certain types of risk it is possible to 
calculate group-based probabilities for harm – the life insurance industry is based on 
such calculations - however, such group-based approaches cannot accurately predict 
such risks at the level of the individual due to the intervening variables that can 
impact on those individuals. Thus, one might argue that risk analysis is essentially 
indicative rather than predictive, and that the interpretation of the information 
available in risk assessments becomes a social construction as a consequence (Beck, 
1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).  If we extend the processes around risk 
generation over space and time, then the strategic nature of risk management becomes 
an even more complex task and it begins to encompass much more of the uncertainty 
facing decision-makers.  
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Conventional risk analytical tools are at their strongest when dealing with 
events that have an actuarial basis for analysis, where the frequency of occurrence is 
such that it allows for the assessment of the probabilities of failure and does so with a 
high degree of reliability. For low probability, high consequence events, or those 
events involving human agency, actuarial approaches to determining risk are 
invariably more problematic. Within this context, uncertainty drives the decision 
making process and the knowledge available to decision-makers becomes a key factor 
in determining organisational effectiveness. When those decisions are extended in 
space and time and the cause and effect relationships between elements are 
correspondingly difficult to identify, then the processes around the use of risk analysis 
becomes more problematic. Even within routine decision problems, uncertainty plays 
an important role in shaping the actions of organisations and especially the human 
operators within them. Uncertainty is, therefore, a critical element with the processes 
of managing harmful events. If there is no uncertainty then there will be no need for 
individuals and groups to make a decision as the outcomes will be known and 
understood by all parties concerned – risk will, therefore, be predictable. Managers, it 
could be argued, exist to deal with this uncertainty but they may also play a 
significant role in shaping it as a function of their behaviours, decisions, knowledge, 
and understanding. In particular, the ways in which expert judgment and leadership 
style can contribute to the potential for failure is an important element in the 
embedding of error cost within the strategy process.  
The management of ‘risk’ should be a central component of management 
practices, especially within a strategic context. However, despite its significance, it 
can be seen as being largely a marginal element of management theory (especially in 
terms of strategy) and certainly does not seem to occupy the central role within the 
practice agenda that one might expect (Bolton & Galloway, 2014; Currie, Knights, & 
Starkey, 2010; Fischbacher-Smith & Fischbacher-Smith, 2013; Mikes, 2009). Whilst 
there is little doubt that the attention given to risk has increased over the last thirty 
years, the pervasive nature of its role within organisations remains something an 
elusive challenge for organisational scholars. There are several reasons why the 
management of risk has proved problematic. These include: the need for risk 
management to be holistic in its approach (Bolton & Galloway, 2014), the 
development of “calculative cultures” (Mikes, 2009) that often assume that risks can 
be effectively predicted and controlled; the meanings and ambiguities of the various 
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terms that are associated with risk: and the requirements for risk management to 
reflect a range of knowledge domains and managerial spans of control.  
Much of the debate within the academic literature has looked at risk in the 
aftermath of major adverse events (Dörner, 1996; Girerenzer, 2002; Knight, 1921; 
Reason, 1997; Shubik, 1954; Turner, 1978) and this discussion has taken on a new 
perspective within the post-modern approaches to dealing with the nature of hazard, 
especially within the context of a globalised environment (Fox, 1999; Giddens, 1990, 
1999). It is in this interconnected environment that ‘risk’ has become a central 
element of debates and a central dynamic of the discussion relates to the ways in 
which the nature of risk is constructed, perceived and acted upon. Within this 
globalised setting, risk is also framed in terms of the relationships between cause and 
effect which can be extended across space and time, with the spatial and 
intergenerational effects of the hazards ultimately proving to be significant factors in 
their management (Fischbacher-Smith & Hudson, 2010; Hudson, 2009).  This has 
created tensions around the role of technical expertise within risk-based decision-
making, the burden of proof, and the ways in which powerful interests can serve to 
shape debates around risk generation (Collingridge & Reeve, 1986; Oreskes, 2004; 
Pigliucci & Boudry, 2014; Walton, 1988). 
The management of risk and its relationship to social expectations creates a 
series of challenges for the decision-making processes within organisations (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982; Power, 2008, 2009). Social expectations are such that there are 
demands around the prediction of risk that cannot be delivered (Power, 2004, 2009) 
and this generates organisational responses around the production of structured 
analyses in an attempt to determine what is essentially the indeterminate probability 
and consequences of hazards. The result is the creation of an ever more complex set 
of analyses and the generation of a calculative culture (Mikes, 2009) in which the 
technocratic processes involved effectively serve to over-rule accountability by 
making the processes of risk analysis more opaque to strategic decision-makers.  
Within this context any ambiguities within the process of analysing risk have the 
potential to generate additional indeterminate problems due to the lack of an effective 
burden of proof and the interventions from different ‘expert’ groups.  
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Indeterminacy and Uncertainty in the generation of strategic failure 
“Uncertainty creates problems for action. Actors' organizations resolve these 
problems by following rules of thumb, using rituals, relying on habitual 
patterns, or, more self-consciously, by setting goals and making plans to reach 
them. These devices provide the determinateness and certainty needed to 
embark upon organizational action in the present” – (Turner, 1976), p. 378. 
 
A key aspect of the challenge around risk assessment relates to the 
indeterminate nature of some of the information available to decision-makers and this 
challenges the nature of the knowledge and understanding in those areas where the 
accuracy of that information is critical. This has echoes of Rumsfeld’s (2002, 2011) 
notion of what is known and the range of things that remain unknown. In the case of 
the latter, it is possible for organisations to be aware of the limitations of their 
knowledge (the known unknowns), but there is also the potential for some of this 
knowledge to be indeterminate (the unknown unknowns). These unknown unknowns 
can arise from a number of factors.  
Firstly, the nature of complexity within the socio-technical systems in which 
the failure is situated serves to undermine deterministic and calculative approaches to 
prediction (Sherden, 1998). The nature of emergent conditions within complex 
systems –essentially those unforeseen elements that arise out of the interactions 
between systems components – serves to generate problems around predicting likely 
event scenarios (Smith, 2005). Secondly, the situational context in which such risk 
assessments are undertaken is also seen to be problematic (Sherden, 1998). Here, 
psychological processes that impact upon decision-making play a major role in 
shaping the ways in which we see the world (Kahneman, 2011; Sabatier, 1987, 1988; 
Weick, 1993, 1995). The core beliefs, values and assumptions of decision-makers are 
important elements in serving to shape the ways in which they see the world 
(Fischbacher-Smith, 2012; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992).    Thirdly, and in a related 
manner, the nature of expert judgement is also a key element of the process of 
determining risk, but one that can be coerced by powerful interests (Collingridge & 
Reeve, 1986). Finally, the prediction of failure becomes more problematic as we 
extend that assessment out over space and time, thereby encompassing more 
uncertainty into the decision-making process.   
Despite the limitations of our abilities to deal with the indeterminate nature of 
many forms of hazard and the constraints that exist around our knowledge and 
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understanding, organisations are willing to make a set of assumptions about the nature 
of the hazards that they face. They then use those assumptions to design the 
parameters of the control systems that are put in place. Turner (1976) highlights the 
ways in which such assumptions around routine processes can lead to the incubation 
of failure as the realities of systems performance become markedly different from the 
perceived parameters of that system in its designed-for state. Socio-technical systems 
generate emergent conditions that can result in sudden, unforeseen task demands that 
further compound the problems around decision-making and the performance of 
organisational controls (Gavetti, 2005; Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Kiesler & Sproull, 
1982; Smith, 2005).  In this context, the knowledge base of the organisation and the 
nature of technical expertise within it, are important elements in shaping the discourse 
around risk and uncertainty. It is here, that the notion of what the organisation knows 
and understands relative to what it does not fully know, gives shape to the nature of 
debates around risk. In the latter context, organisations can be either aware or 
unaware, of the exact nature of their knowledge boundaries. Risk management 
should, in an ideal context, reflect the known elements around the hazard portfolio 
and it should allow for the determination of the probabilities of failure with a 
reasonable degree of reliability. In addition, the failure modes and effects associated 
with the hazard should be clear and understood. As we move into those areas where 
the balance between the established knowledge base and the unknown characteristics 
of the system shifts in the direction of the latter, then the uncertainty that this 
generates has the potential to incubate the potential for crisis and erode the 
organisation’s abilities to manage hazards in an effective manner (Fischbacher-Smith, 
2014a).  
Within this uneven terrain of knowledge, there have been calls to widen the 
base of recognised sources of expertise (Michael, 1992). The result has been the 
emergence of ‘citizen science’ (Irwin, 1995, 2001) in which it is recognised that 
public groups often hold relevant and valid knowledge about the potential hazards 
generated by organisations (Irwin, Dale, & Smith, 1996; Wynne, 1992, 1996). This 
approach has the effect of changing the parameters of legitimised expertise, especially 
where the phenomena in question is poorly understood, and it challenges the 
traditional power and legitimacy of the various parties involved in risk debates 
(Fischbacher-Smith, Irwin, & Fischbacher-Smith, 2010). In those conflicts where the 
potential for harm is significant, it may lead to calls for a more precautionary 
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approach to dealing with the hazards (Calman & Smith, 2001; Fischbacher-Smith & 
Calman, 2010). Strategically, this generates challenges for organisations in terms of 
their abilities to anticipate public concerns about their activities and the abilities to 
communicate the nature of the risk to those who may be affected. These strategic 
processes are also framed within spatial and temporal settings and harms are often 
realised in a sense of place and it is to an examination of these interactions that the 
paper now turns.  
 
 
Transforming hazards  
 
  A key element within the realisation of risk and the generation of harm relates 
to the processes by which transformations take place within the system. Systems are 
designed against a set of parameters and unless these parameters are reassessed on a 
regular basis, there will be the potential for the system to move from its designed for 
state into a state that is far from its equilibrium position. This can arise over space and 
time as adaptation can occur differentially in response to a range of perturbations. 
These perturbations, or disruptions, that impact upon the system have the effect of 
stimulating a response from the organisation either as local adaptations or through 
more systematic changes in operational protocols (Smith, 1995; Smith, 2005). Over 
time, organisations can adapt to these new ways of working but can fail to change 
their core protocols for dealing with the new set of conditions. Similarly, as the 
environment changes – moving from an ordered state, through complex to  a chaotic 
one – it will generate different task demands that may exceed the organisation’s 
abilities to respond in a timeframe that allows them to remain effective (Fischbacher-
Smith, 2014b; Kauffman, 1993). It is this set of transformation processes that can 
move the organisation into crisis. There are several stages here.   
In the first instance, organisations are faced with a set of environmental 
challenges that are either benign or threatening. The uncertainty inherent in this 
ambiguity can generate problems for the organisation at multiple levels. If these 
challenges are perceived to generate a threat to the organisation’s current stability, 
then decision-makers within the organisation will seek to make sense of it and, in 
doing so, will deal with it through processes of enactment – the rules for systems use 
– in which previously held assumptions around the nature of threat-response 
relationships have generated a set of processes and procedures (controls) that shape 
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accepted forms of response (Hall, 1984; Hodge & Coronado, 2007; Smith, 2005; 
Tsoukas, 1999). For many types of events, the actions arise from a set of routine 
processes – possibly generating a condition of mindlessness - and occur as a function 
of the various individual or organisational scripts that guide behaviours and which are 
based on past experience (Ashforth & Fried, 1988; Cohen, Levinthal, & Warglien, 
2014). However, there are also issues arising out of the relationships between the 
individual and the group – the notion of collective (group) mind (Weick & Roberts, 
1993). The result of this process can generate phenomena such as groupthink (Esser, 
1998; Janis, 1971, 1972) or paradigm blindness (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012, 2013) and 
in both cases, it may result in organisational decision-makers being unable to 
recognise the fundamental flaws in their decisions.   This becomes especially 
significant in those settings where the task demands of the event move beyond the 
experience base of those making the decisions. In these cases, the selection of 
adaptive strategies becomes more problematic as previous experiences will not serve 
to guide behaviours, and the impacts of groupthink and paradigm blindness will 
impact upon the selection of alternative perspectives (that might run counter to the 
dominant paradigm) and shape group decision behaviours accordingly. The 
organisational recipes that arise from this process are often used as a means of 
shaping attempts at effectiveness (Bernard, 1998) but they may fail to work in a 
systems state that has moved away from that for which it was designed. Moving a 
system away from its designed-for state is a function of a number of factors that 
reflect the complexity inherent within the system and especially the speed and extent 
of those interactions. This reflects the processes identified by Perrow (1981, 1984, 
2011) around tight coupling and interactive complexity and the potential that this has 
to generate the revenge effects identified by Tenner (1996). Figure 1 identified some 
of the main elements that typify the transformation processes that can move the 
system towards failure.  
  Space, place and time are also important transformational processes that can 
shape the dynamics of the harm that can arise from various forms of hazards. These 
hazards exist within space and are located in places. Time is an important element in 
shaping both exposure to the hazard and the framing of the population that will be 
placed at risk. Taken in its totality, a hazard generates harms across multiple 
distances, over different time frames, and across multiple spaces (either as levels 
within activities or across activities – which may be interconnected). Thus, risk 
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(which is the probability of a particular hazard occurring and the consequences 
associated with it) exists in space and time and is contextualised within a sense of 
place. This has the effect of generating different levels of risk across space and time, 
which will generate different levels of acceptability amongst those populations who 
are deemed to be at risk. From a strategic perspective, this introduces a further layer 
of complexity into the process.  
 
Acceptability of risk 
“’riskiness’ means more to people than ‘expected number of fatalities’. 
Attempts to characterize, compare, and regulate risks must be sensitive to the 
broader conception of risk that underlies people’s concerns” – (Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982) p. 92.  
 
 The final group of issues raised in figure 1 concerns the processes that 
surround the acceptability of risk. Acceptability is shaped by the RIT components and 
can be seen as a function of the ways in which we make sense of the information that 
is available to us. This is shaped, in turn, by the paradigmatic and heuristic lenses that 
we use within the sense-making process and is also shaped by the transformations that 
take place at particular points in space and time. In addition, there are issues 
surrounding the comparability of certain forms of risk in affective the ways that 
individuals make judgements about their acceptability (Johnson, 2004). If, as some 
suggest, risk assessment is a social construction (Beck, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982) then any ambiguities and uncertainty within the calculation of risk and its 
expression will have a potential impact on different levels of acceptability. The level 
of trust that those at risk have in those who are communicating the nature of the risk is 
also an important variable in shaping the processes around risk acceptability (Earle, 
2010; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2005; Smith & Irwin, 1984) as are the networks through 
which people communicate and make sense of the issues (Short, 1984). 
 In an increasingly globalised context, the notion of risk acceptability becomes 
even more problematic as hazardous activities can be exported in response to different 
regulatory environments and levels of public concern (Hudson, 2009; Nanda & 
Bailey, 1988). This exporting of hazard has been seen as a reflection of domestic 
practices in which low-income areas are often chosen to be the location for hazardous 
activities (Marbury, 1995; Pastor, Sadd, & Hipp, 2001). The diverse nature of such 
communities, especially within an international setting, can also play a role in shaping 
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the nature of the hazards as a result of impact of lifestyle and social behaviours on 
risk pathways (Dunn & Alexeeff, 2010). Such communities are also less likely to be 
able to deal with the power of polluting companies and regulatory authorities and this 
has the potential to lead to further forms of exploitation.  
 In addition to the spatial dynamics of acceptability, there are also issues 
around the population at risk. There are certain types of hazard that are deemed to be 
more unacceptable than others due to the perceived vulnerabilities of those affected. 
As with the export of hazards to less affluent countries or communities, the notion of 
a vulnerable population is increasingly seen as an important factor in shaping the 
acceptability of risk. Young children, the elderly, or other vulnerable populations, will 
often generate a lower level of tolerance in the wider community around the 
acceptability of risk because these groups are seen as being unable to resist any 
attempts at exploitation.  The debates around the use of the MMR vaccine in the UK, 
for example, illustrates how problems can emerge around such vulnerable 
populations, especially where the standards of behaviour within professional groups 
was called into question (Clements & Ratzan, 2003).  
As a result, the issues around risk acceptability become typified by their multi-
level nature, the variations that can occur over space and time, and the effects 
generated around different populations at risk. Risk acceptability is intrinsically 
linked into the other elements of the RITA framework and it is the combination of the 
factors outlined in figure 1 that makes the incorporation of these issues into the 
strategy process problematic and difficult to deal with. It also raises issues around the 
ethical behaviours of organisations in terms of the ways in which they communicate 
risk and utilise expertise in the framing of risk communication (Collingridge & 
Reeve, 1986) and there is potential for the organisation’s strategies to generate further 
conflict that may ultimately result in the onset of a crisis for the organisation. The 
interactions between the elements of the RITA framework are such that they generate 
a range of challenges for organisations, which are then configured as a consequence 
of the spatial and temporal settings in which they are set.  
 
Conclusions 
“The learning that should follow failure often does not occur, and when it does 
occur, it often teaches the wrong lessons” – (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005, p. 
295.).  
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The strategic nature of failures within organisations remains a potentially 
significant issue for management theory and practice. This chapter has sought to set 
out a range of issues that could be seen to account for the criticisms of organisational 
practices around the lack of synergies between risk, resilience and strategy (Mikes, 
2009, 2011). The interconnections that exist between the activities of organisations 
serve to generate emergent conditions that have the potential to exceed the 
contingency plans that organisations have put in place. These perturbations have a 
significant impact on the performance of individual decision-makers within the 
organisation and raise issues around the incorporation of knowledge, uncertainty, and 
ambiguity within attempts to develop effective organisational strategies.  
At the core of this process is the role and behaviours of human actors – both as 
decision-makers and enactors of organisational strategies. Within debates involving 
complex socio-technical systems, where there is a potentially high level of harm, 
there is often an overlay of technical expertise within the assessment of risk. In such 
cases, the potential for the incubation of errors within the decision-making process 
remains high. One antidote to these processes is often framed within the construct of 
organisational learning. This has been a constant theme within the risk literature but it 
does raise some important questions about the potential barriers that might exist to 
that learning (Smith & Elliott, 2007). If organisations are going to become more 
effective at integrating risk management processes within their strategies then they 
will need to develop more effective mechanisms for learning from the experiences of 
others, both within and outside of their own organisational boundaries. Within that 
context, the range of issues identified within the RITA framework provides a 
challenge to the learning capabilities that the organisation has in place.  
The complexities associated with the RITA elements provide a set of 
parameters around which organisations should seek to develop their capabilities and 
ensure that staff, at various levels within the organisation, are familiar with the 
ambiguities that such elements generate. A failure to frame the RITA elements in a 
holistic way will ensure that the management of risk and the development of 
resilience will remain hampered by the fractured landscape that is developed as a 
result of a reductionist approach to dealing with the issues. Strategic management 
practice necessitates a greater degree of integration of the main concepts associated 
with risk and resilience with those that are core to the processes of strategic 
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management. Business education has a central role to play here, but it has largely 
failed to see this as a key set of debates within the undergraduate and postgraduate 
curriculum. Unless and until there is a wholesale increase in the awareness of the 
nuances around risk and the limitations that exist within the decision-making process 
around such issues, then the fractures between risk and strategy will persist.  
The arguments developed here are only a first step in framing the parameters 
that underpin the dislocation between strategy and risk management. Further work is 
needed to test the issues identified here within an organisational setting and also to 
consider the implications that they might have for the education of managers in both 
risk and strategic management. Allowing the continuation of a gap between the key 
organisational functions or risk management and strategy will simply guarantee that 
organisational failures will continue to be incubated by those very people charged 
with preventing them. In that context, it is worth giving the last word to Barry Turner 
(1994b), who was a pioneer in the integration of risk management and strategy, who 
argued that: 
“…it is necessary to recognise that risk management is concerned with the 
management of uncertainty and not the management of certainty” (p. 155). 
 
It is only by embracing such uncertainty that organisations will make more balanced 
decisions around the management of its risks and move towards becoming more 
resilient in the process.  
___________________________________________________________ 
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